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conclusions, as the association between E and D could be
discovered in all subgroups selected for the study.
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We agree completely that representative studies are im-
mensely valuable for describing disease patterns, quantify-
ing the burden of disease1 and generating risk stratification
models.2 Given representativeness is time- and place-
specific,3 these all need regular updates and more represen-
tative studies. For example, the SCORE (Systematic
COronary Risk Evaluation) system for predicting fatal
cardiovascular disease (CVD) uses the same risk factors
in different models for high- and low-CVD-risk European
countries,4 but over time countries may, also, be promoted
from high to low risk.5 Clearly, such risk prediction mod-
els are not scientific models that describe nature consist-
ently across space and time,6 but they are immensely useful
for service planning, targeting treatment and saving lives.
Conversely, experimental studies, such as animal models
and randomized controlled trials (RCTs), do not require
representativeness to test scientific models.6
On the other hand, whether observational epidemiolo-
gical studies, representative or not, are useful for generat-
ing hypotheses or testing causal factors in scientific models
is less clear. First, these represent the triumph of hope over
experience.7 Second, as was pointed out over 20 years ago,
nearly all possible hypotheses have already been gener-
ated.8 Third, some potentially relevant hypotheses may not
be readily observed for conceptual or practical reasons.
The current paradigm may exclude some hypotheses as im-
possible, making them imperceptible. Apart from well-
known biases inherent in observational studies, causal fac-
tors may be invariant in commonly studied populations,
expensive or difficult to measure, affected by preclinical
disease or hidden within the (mis)classification of diseases
by symptom rather than cause. Fourth, as a discipline we
have not generally thought through the hierarchy of studies
to refute a hypothesis. Our current methods, using the
Bradford-Hill viewpoints as a touchstone, are much more
focused on corroborating hypotheses, with an RCT as the
pinnacle of corroboration. However, even something as
simple as ‘field’ epidemiology may refute hypotheses. For
example, the existence of populations with low birth-
weight and low rates of heart disease casts doubt on a
major role of birthweight in heart disease.9
Given these issues if we want to make progress in identify-
ing causal processes in population health, assuming it is pos-
sible,10 rather than focusing on representativeness in studies
used to generate or test (corroborate) hypotheses, it might be
more useful to look for better ways to generate and screen
plausible hypotheses, before we test them in suitable stud-
ies.11 Other methods of generating hypotheses about the driv-
ers of population health are not obvious, but include using
general mechanistic principles, starting with effective treat-
ments and taking advantage of mechanistic insights from
genetics or RCTs which include potential mediators. Not
only do we need to move on from the debate about represen-
tativeness, we need to move onto some different questions.
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We were recently invited, along with several other authors,
to comment on the paper by Rothman et al.1 on represen-
tativeness.2 The journal editors also commented on
Rothman’s paper3 and took the opportunity to comment
on our paper2 as well as two recent papers of ours pub-
lished in another journal.4,5 We don’t wish to revive or un-
necessarily prolong this debate (the various authors are
largely in agreement in any case), but we would like to
reply in order to correct some misrepresentations of our
work. We can identify many, and it is not possible to re-
spond to all of them in a brief letter.
Ebrahim and Davey Smith claim we ‘suggest that non-
representative populations produce only weak bias in
exposure-disease associations’. In fact, we argued that ‘each
population, including a selected study population, has its
own confounding pattern’, and that ‘there is no reason to be-
lieve that control of confounding can be more easily achieved
in a population-based cohort than in a restricted cohort’.
Either situation can be associated with bias, and there is no a
priori reason to believe that one is always or usually more
biased than the other (e.g. in a study of smoking and lung
cancer, a restricted population such as British doctors may be
less confounded than a general population sample).
In our two recent papers we explored the effects of
selection through a ‘simulation study’4 and an ‘empirical
study’ of an internet-based birth cohort.5 In the simulation
study, we considered a simplified scenario including an
exposure E, an outcome D and a determinant R of both the
selection S and the outcome. We simulated scenarios in
which selection introduces bias and concluded that the bias
is very small (a true relative risk for the exposure-outcome
association of 1.00 becomes 1.02) in situations in which all
relative risks involved are 2.0 or 0.5, and modest (a true rela-
tive risk of 1.00 becomes 1.16) when all relative risks are 4.0
or 0.25. We argued that ‘it is unlikely that multiple and inde-
pendent important disease risk factors would affect the sam-
ple selection’ (this sentence quoted by Ebrahim and Davey
Smith) and that ‘it is indeed reasonable to consider R as a
vector resulting from the combination of a set of correlated
risk factors, all moderately associated with S’ (this part not
quoted by Ebrahim and Davey Smith who instead suggested
that we missed the point that multiple risk factors may play a
role). It is important to emphasize the term ‘independent’ in
the above quote: risk factors tend to cluster together, so selec-
tion processes which are biased with respect to one risk fac-
tor may be biased with respect to others in the same cluster;
but, for precisely this reason, the total bias from the cluster
of associated risk factors is usually not much greater than the
bias from one factor alone—in either case, our estimates
apply for the range of relative risks that we considered.
International Journal of Epidemiology, 2014, Vol. 43, No. 2 632
VC The Author 2014; all rights reserved. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the International Epidemiological Association
